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Abstract
When individuals make decisions regarding their allocation
of time and income, the health investment and health that
they achieve may fall short of the goals prescribed by med-
ical guidelines and health policymakers. Instead of the oft-
observed policy responses such as additional spending on
public awareness campaigns, it may be more fruitful to de-
termine how individuals can be induced to choose behav-
iors that will lead to the prescribed health. That is, one must
recognize the trade-offs between health investment and con-
sumption or leisure today in the face of factors such as social
norms, job stress and advances in health technology.
1. Introduction
Health policy sometimes falls short of its intended goals. For example, medi-
cal guidelines regarding markers for optimal health (e.g., cholesterol levels,
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blood pressure levels, body mass index) are introduced with the implicit
message that if you achieve these markers you will be healthier and hap-
pier than your peers who do not. However, subsequent reports often
find that many individuals do not achieve these markers for good health.
Are these less healthy individuals really less happy? Most likely they are
not.
When individuals make decisions concerning the allocation of their
resources of time and income, the level of health investment and health
that they achieve may fall short of what is prescribed by medical guide-
lines. Such policy goals may be particularly challenging in the face of so-
cial norms of consumption and leisure (the markers actually used in in-
dividuals’ decision making), job stress, and advances in health technology.
The public policy response is often additional spending on public aware-
ness campaigns, even when the public is already aware. Even though more
medical research to improve the health of individuals is an admirable goal
in and of itself, it may not be a cure for a poorly designed policy. Instead,
it may be more fruitful to determine how individuals can be induced to
choose behaviors that will lead to the prescribed health while acknowledg-
ing the trade-offs between health investment and consumption or leisure
today.
In the spirit of Grossman’s (1972) health investment model, we sug-
gest a theoretical framework where one makes investments today in terms
of healthy activities and medical care to achieve one’s desired health tomor-
row while considering factors that can potentially prevent one from achiev-
ing or further encourage one’s health investment. First, let us consider why
social norms of consumption and leisure matter. An individual perceives a
level of consumption and leisure obtained by individuals around her and as
such she makes her own consumption and leisure decisions based on the
norms she views. In other words, what consumption and leisure must she
obtain in order to “keep up with the Joneses.” In the context of a health
investment model, such social norms are a mechanism that may alter de-
cisions regarding medical expenditures and time spent in healthy activities
such as exercise, which ultimately affect health in both positive and negative
manners.
Second, our model suggests that greater education may not always be
associated with greater health, as was found by Grossman (1972), if forces such
as job stress are present. There may also be complementarity or substitutability
between leisure or consumption and health. That is, some individuals choose
consumption and leisure that have positive spillovers to health, such as a high
fiber/low fat diet, gardening, or playing tennis. These choices may result in
individuals foregoing direct investments in medical care or exercise time.
Lastly, we find that individuals may view increases in health technology as the
“silver bullet” whereby they can increase consumption and leisure today while
believing they are still making adequate investment in health for tomorrow;
this, unfortunately, may not come to pass.
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2. Background
The application of the human capital model (Becker 1964, 1967) to
health largely began with Grossman’s (1972) model of health capital as a
component of human capital (see discussion in Grossman (2000) and nu-
merous extensions thereof). In his basic model of the demand for health,
health is a capital good that generates a stream of health services. Produc-
tion of health takes time and money, and thus determines the amount of time
available for market and non-market activities as well as the amount of income
available to purchase non-health goods. The production of health outputs is
determined by an individual’s innate abilities and/or characteristics, which
define her personal health production function, and by health inputs such
as medical care, diet, and exercise.
In most models of health capital, consumption of non-health goods and
leisure generally yield unambiguous utility benefits, i.e., more is always better.
Muurinen (1982) suggests, however, that some behaviors such as smoking
or overeating might be causes of use-related deterioration of health. Sim-
ilarly, Forster (2001) acknowledges such behaviors where, in a model with
health in the utility function, utility-maximizing individuals choose healthy or
unhealthy consumption, though unhealthy consumption is utility reducing.
However, we observe that individuals choose to engage in certain behaviors
or lifestyles, whether smoking, overeating, or no physical activity, that may be
health reducing, but which enhance overall well-being.
Several explanations have been put forth in trying to explain the propen-
sity to engage in unhealthy behaviors at the expense of current and future
health. If the rate of time preference is sufficiently high such that agents
discount the future health risks associated with current, possibly, unhealthy
consumption and inactivity, then the prevalence of unhealthy conditions such
as obesity could increase (Levy 2002, Komlos, Smith, and Bogin 2004). Alter-
natively, individuals may have time-inconsistent preferences or varying rates
of time preference (Gruber and Koszegi 2001, Frederick, Lowenstein, and
O’Donoghue 2002). Becker and Murphy (1988) suggest, in their rational
addiction model, that unhealthy behaviors such as overeating or underex-
ercising can rationally occur. For example, past caloric intake provides in-
creased marginal utility of calories consumed and thus has a positive impact
on current and future calorie consumption. Agents could have problems with
self-control (Thaler and Shefrin 1981, O’Donoghue and Rabin 2000), or they
may perceive the behavioral adjustment costs to be too great to adjust their
consumption and leisure toward more healthful living (Bednarek, Jeitschko,
and Pecchenino 2006).
It has been recognized that social norms also matter. Individuals have a
natural tendency to compare their situation—whether consumption, income,
leisure, saving, or health—to that of those around them. Individuals make
these social comparisons for self-enhancement and/or self-improvement pur-
poses (Falk and Knell 2004). Easterlin (1974) was one of the first economists
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to suggest that social norms matter for an individual’s happiness or well-
being. In particular, he found that one’s own income—absolute income—
influences happiness, but perhaps, more importantly, one’s income relative
to that of one’s neighbors also affects one’s happiness. More recent studies
(e.g., Easterlin 1995, Clark and Oswald 1996, Blanchflower and Oswald 2004)
have found further evidence confirming that relative income, and not just
absolute income, matters for an individual’s happiness.
Another line of research in the public health and economics literature
has suggested that relative income, more than absolute income, is associ-
ated with the health of individuals. Using aggregate data Wilkinson (1996,
1997a, 1997b) and others (see, e.g., Kaplan et al. 1996, Kennedy, Kawachi,
and Prothrow-Stith 1996) found that greater income inequality is associated
with poorer health. To this extent, social norms dictate that individuals use
their resources to achieve a minimum level of income or consumption. How-
ever, these findings have been challenged by others such as Deaton (1999). In
particular, support of the relative income–health association is much weaker,
based on micro-level analyses of individuals, for a range of health measures
including individual mortality, self-reported health, and infant birth weight
(see Meara 2001, Mellor and Milyo 2002, Gerdtham and Johannesson 2004).
In all of these studies, aggregate measures of income inequality such as state or
metropolitan indicators are employed. Although the evidence is mixed with
regard to the degree to which comparisons, (i.e., social norms of income
matter)—whether for overall well-being or for narrowly defined health—it
is clearly worth considering the ways in which social norms influence one’s
consumption and leisure decisions and, ultimately, health.
3. The Model
Agents live for two periods and have preferences defined over consumption,
time spent at leisure, and health. The value of consumption and leisure activ-
ities is affected by social norms of consumption and leisure: agents try to keep
up with the Joneses. Agents’ initial health stocks are given and they invest to-
day in their health tomorrow by engaging in health-improving activities and
by purchasing medical care. One’s health is not only influenced directly by
time and money spent on health today but also indirectly via other consump-
tion and leisure. Specifically, some consumption is health enhancing, as is
some leisure; the extent of this enhancement depends on the healthiness of
one’s lifestyle, which can be interpreted as a socially influenced preference
parameter. Further, the quality of health production technology, which in-
cludes one’s genes, the state of medical knowledge, public health, and access
to health care, also influences future health.
The agent’s preferences are defined by
U
(
c1 − c∗1, 1 − ∗1, H 1
) + δV (c2 − c∗2, 2 − ∗2, H 2), (1)
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where ct is the consumption of goods in period t, t is leisure in period t,
H t is the agent’s health stock in period t, H 1 given, c∗t is social norm level of
consumption in period t, ∗t is the social norm for leisure activities in period
t, and δ is the agent’s rate of time discount; where t = 1, 2. Assume,
Ui > 0, Uii ≤ 0, Uij > 0; i , j = 1, 2, 3 and
U 1 → ∞ as c → 0, U 2 → ∞ as  → 0;
Vi > 0, Vii ≤ 0, Vij > 0; i , j = 1, 2, 3 and
V 1 → ∞ as c → 0, V 2 → ∞ as  → 0.
The agent produces future health by making health-augmenting invest-
ments today. Let
H 2 = h(m + βc1, e + µ1, θ) + (1 − σ)H 1, (2)
where
hi > 0, hii < 0, hij < 0; i, j = 1, 2, 3; and β, µ > 0, 0 < σ < 1
and m is expenditures on physical and mental health care, e is time spent in
healthy activities, β and µ measure the healthiness of one’s lifestyle (i.e., the
indirect benefit to one’s health of one’s non-health consumption and leisure
choices), σ is the rate at which one’s initial health depreciates and is a measure
of the stressfulness of one’s life, which may depend on job characteristics
or social pressures, and θ measures the quality of one’s individual health
production technology. By assumption, medical care, healthy activities, and
technology are substitutes in the production of health.
Health investments pay off in a number of ways. First, since one values
health for its own sake, the higher is your investment in health today, the
better off you are tomorrow. Second, having a higher health stock improves
one’s productivity. Thus, an investment in health today increases your income
and purchasing power tomorrow. Finally, the healthier you are, the more you
enjoy your time spent at leisure; that is, good health increases the quality of
leisure. Overall, the greater your health investments today, the more goods
you can buy, the greater the value of each unit of leisure, and the healthier
you are tomorrow.
The agent is endowed with one unit of time in each period, supplies
wt units of labor inelastically in period t, and divides his remaining time
between leisure and healthy activities. He divides his current income, y1,
between consumption of goods and medical care to maximize (1) subject to
(2) and
1 − w1 = 1 + e (3)
y1 = c1 + p mm (4)
1 − w2 = 2 (5)
c2 = y(H 2); y ′ > 0, y ′′ ≤ 0 (6)
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∗2 = ˆk(H 2); ˆ > 0, k ′ < 0, k ′′ ≥ 0, (7)
where pm is the price of medical care, the price of consumption having been
normalized to unity, and Equation (6) represents the relationship between
one’s health and one’s future productivity (income), which is positive but de-
creases at the margin. Equation (7) represents the link between one’s health
and the perception of the quality of one’s leisure time. That is, the healthier
one is, the less onerous one finds the impingement of social norms on one’s
time.
Substitute Equations (3) and (4) into Equation (2) to yield
H 2 = H (c1, 1, θ) = h
(
y1 − c1
p m
+ βc1, 1 − w1 − (1 − µ)1, θ
)
+ (1 − σ)H 1,
(8)
where
Hc1 = h1
(
− 1
p m
+ β
)
< 0 by − 1
p m
+ β < 0 (direct effect of medical care
is greater than indirect effect of healthy lifestyle)
H1 = −h2(1 − µ) < 0
Hc11 = −
(
− 1
p m
+ β
)
(1 − µ)h12 < 0
Hw1 = −h2 < 0
Hc1w1 = −h12
(
− 1
p m
+ β
)
< 0
H1w1 = h22(1 − µ) < 0
Hσ = −H 1 < 0
Hθ = h3 > 0
Hc1θ = h13
(
− 1
p m
+ β
)
> 0
H1θ = −h23(1 − µ) > 0
Hβ = h1c1 > 0
Hc1β = h11
(
− 1
p m
+ β
)
+ h1 > 0
H1β = −h21(1 − µ)c1 > 0
Hµ = h21 > 0
Hc1µ = h12
(
− 1
p m
+ β
)
1 > 0
H1µ = −h22(1 − µ)1 > 0
HH 1 = (1 − σ) > 0
Hy1 =
h1
p m
> 0
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Hc1 y1 = h11
(
− 1
p m
+ β
)
1
p m
> 0
H1 y1 = −h21(1 − µ)
1
p m
> 0
Hp m = −h1
(
y1 − c1
(p m)2
)
< 0
Hc1p m = −h11
(
− 1
p m
+ β
) (
y1 − c1
(p m)2
)
+ h1
(p m)2
< 0 (if first term is large)
H1p m = h21(1 − µ)
(
y1 − c1
(p m)2
)
< 0
Substitute Equations (5)–(7) into V () to define
W (c1, 1, θ) ≡ V (y(H (c1, 1, θ)) − c∗2,
1 − w2 − ˆk(H (c1, 1, θ)), H (c1, 1, θ)). (9)
Then, it is straightforward, if tedious, to show that if
V11(y ′)2 + V1 y ′′ − 2V12 y ′ˆk ′ + V22(ˆk ′)2
−V2ˆk ′′ − 2V23ˆk ′ + 2V13 y ′ + V33 =  < 0,
and since
V1 y ′ − V2ˆk ′ + V3 = ω > 0,
then
Wc1 = ωHc1 < 0
Wc1c1 = H 2c1 + ωHc1c1 < 0
W1 = ωH1 < 0
W11 = H 21 + ωH11 < 0
Wc11 = Hc1 H1 + ωHc11 < 0
Wc1w1 = Hc1 Hw1 + ωHc1w1 < 0
W1w1 = H1 Hw1 + ωH1w1 < 0
Wc1σ = Hc1 Hσ < 0
W1σ = H1 Hσ < 0
Wc1p m = Hc1 Hp m + ωHc1p m < 0
W1p m = H1 Hp m + ωH1p m < 0
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Wc1θ = Hc1 Hθ + ωHc1θ > 0
W1θ = H1 Hθ + ωH1θ > 0
Wc1β = Hc1 Hβ + ωHc1β > 0
W1β = H1 Hβ + ωH1β > 0
Wc1 ı` = Hc1 Hµ + ωHc1µ > 0
W1µ = H1 Hµ + ωH1µ > 0
Wc1 y1 = Hc1 Hy1 + ωHc1 y1 > 0
W1 y1 = H1 Hy1 + ωH1 y1 > 0
Wc1H 1 = Hc1 HH 1 > 0
W1H 1 = H1 HH 1 > 0
and if V12 y ′ − V22ˆk ′ + V32 < 0 (direct effects of an increase in w 2 exceed
indirect effects),
Wc1w2 , W1w2 < 0,
if V11 y ′ − V21ˆk ′ + V31 < 0 (direct effects of an increase in c∗2 exceed indirect
effects),
Wcc∗2 , Wc∗2 < 0,
and if V12 y ′k − V22ˆk ′ + V2k ′ + V32k < 0 (direct effects of an increase in ˆ
exceed indirect effects),
Wc ˆ, Wˆ < 0.
Substitute (9) into (1), thereby specifying the agent’s lifetime utility as
a function of his current consumption and current leisure. The individual’s
objective is to choose c1 and 1 to maximize
U
(
c1 − c∗1, 1 − ∗1, H 1
) + δW (c1, 1, θ). (10)
The first-order conditions of the agent’s problem are
Uc + δWc = 0,
U + δW = 0.
The individual’s consumption, and thus medical care, decisions and his
leisure, and thus healthy activity, decisions today will determine not only his
happiness today but also his health, income, and the quality of his leisure
time, (i.e., his happiness tomorrow). These are strong inducements to invest
in health. But one’s happiness today also matters creating a tension between
happiness today versus happiness in the future and current happiness and
future health.
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3.1. Comparative Statics
Totally differentiating the first-order conditions we have[
Uc1c1 + δWc1c1 Uc11 + δWc11
Uc11 + δWc11 U11 + δW11
] [
dc1
d1
]
=
[−δWc1w1
−δW1w1
]
dw1 +
[−δWc1σ
−δW1σ
]
dσ +
[ −Uc1H 1 − δWc1H 1
−U1H 1 − δW1H 1
]
dH 1
+
[−Uc1c∗1
−U1c∗1
]
dc∗1 +
[−Uc1∗1
−U1∗1
]
d∗1 +
[−δWc1θ
−δW1θ
]
dθ +
[−δWc1β
−δW1β
]
dβ
+
[−δWc1µ
−δW1µ
]
dµ +
[−δWc1 y1
−δW1 y1
]
dy1 +
[−δWc1w2
−δW1w2
]
dw2 +
[−δWc1p m
−δW1p m
]
dp m
+
[−δWc1 ˆ
−δW1 ˆ
]
d ˆ +
[−Uc1c∗2
−U1c∗2
]
dc∗2 +
[−Wc
−W
]
dδ.
It is straightforward to show the following:
PROPOSITION 1: Assume Uc1c1 U11 + δUc1c1 W11 − δUc11 Wc11 > (Uc11 )2.
(i) The higher the demands of the social norms on an individual’s current
income, c∗1, (current time, 
∗
1 ), the more he consumes (the more time he
spends in leisure pursuits), but he compensates by spending more time in
healthy activities (more on medical care) to maintain his future health. The
net effect on future health, income, and the quality of leisure is ambiguous.
(ii) The higher the demands of the social norms on an individual’s future income,
c∗2, (future time, ) the less he consumes in terms of both goods and leisure
today, instead investing in health, increasing future income, health, and the
quality of leisure.
As members of society, we measure ourselves relative to our peers. The
higher the bar of the social norm placed on an individual, even if self-imposed,
the more the external show of consumption and leisure activities matters rela-
tive to the internal and future benefit of good health; being healthy tomorrow
does not make one happy today. Thus, when investments in health are made,
they are made only after the imperatives of the social norms are met.
When these imperatives are, at least to some extent, self-imposed as a
result of one’s choice of identity (Akerlof and Kranton 2000), those with a
strong innate sense of self that does not rely on equaling or surpassing others
(with low c∗ and ∗) will be both happier and healthier than their less-secure
peers. Thus, as is consistent with Graham, Eggers, and Sukhtanhar (2004),
the happier among us today will be the healthier and happier tomorrow.
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However, if those behavioral norms of income and leisure are restricted
to or are stronger in the future, one is induced to invest in health today in
order to reduce the burden of meeting the norm in the future. Knowing today
what the social imperative is tomorrow, conceivably, could be reinterpreted
as a positive goal to be achieved. Incentives to ensure good behavior are
effectively in place whereby the discount rate is effectively lowered to achieve
greater health tomorrow.
PROPOSITION 2: Assume ∂c 1/∂ y 1 < 1. Higher income (or a lower price of medical
care) today increases consumption of goods and leisure today while reducing time spent
in healthy activities and increasing expenditures on medical care, but has an ambiguous
effect on future health, income, and the quality of leisure.
Higher income (either directly or via a lower price of medical care) today
allows an individual to consume more today, both in terms of goods and
medical care, while the effect on future health is ambiguous. As Grossman
(1972) first noted, an increase in medical care does not necessarily translate
into an increase in health. As more is spent on medical care, a substitute
for healthy activities, higher income will lead to less time being spent on
health-augmenting behaviors, since consumption of goods and leisure are
complementary. In other words, more medical care is purchased as a result
of greater income (or a lower price); however, medical care spending distorts
the amount of dollars spent on health investment relative to healthy activities.
The net effect on future health depends on the substitutability of medical
care and healthy activities in the production of health. The more substitutable
they are, the more likely that future health, and thus income and the qual-
ity of leisure, will rise. This suggests that a secular rise in income would be
accompanied by a secular increase in expenditures on medical interventions
and a secular decrease in behavioral modifications to promote good health.
Thus, such trends could be accompanied by increases, or decreases, in mea-
sured health. Our result challenges the conventional wisdom that higher in-
come is unequivocally associated with better health (see, e.g., Gerdtham and
Johannesson 2004, Viscusi 2006). In fact, our result may be more in line with
Wilkinson (1997a) who suggests that, at least in developed countries, abso-
lute income is not associated with health. Instead, relative incomes or income
inequality may matter for health, possibly through the mechanism of social
norms and the psycho-social stresses of relative circumstances. As has been
pointed out in literature (e.g., Mellor and Milyo 2001), one should tread cau-
tiously in any empirical test of the relationship between income and health
as it is not clear whether income, per se, affects health or whether income and
health are correlated with one or more other unobserved variables.
PROPOSITION 3: A healthier lifestyle (higher β or µ) increases consumption of
goods and leisure, thereby reducing medical expenditures and time spent in healthy
activities. The effect on future health, income, and leisure quality will be positive if the
direct effect of the healthier lifestyle outweighs the indirect effect of lower specific health
investments.
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A healthier lifestyle, whether an intrinsic preference or one adopted to
meet social norms, is captured in the beneficial spillover from one’s consump-
tion and leisure choices onto one’s health. Such a lifestyle is often touted as
a road to happiness via better health and the benefits to health in terms of
greater income and a higher quality of leisure. However, this may not be the
case since a healthier lifestyle today enables one to have one’s cake and eat
more of it today, but at the possible expense of lower health tomorrow. At
first glance this may seem counterintuitive, yet one’s healthier lifestyle inten-
sifies one’s pleasure in life today, thus making the present loom larger in the
decision calculus, thereby reducing the incentives to make direct investments
in one’s future health. Since an individual receives some benefits to future
health indirectly through healthy consumption and leisure, one can, to some
extent, play a naming game of reclassifying consumption and leisure as health
investment. The result, however, may be to cheat one’s own future health by
spending leisure time at tennis or consuming brussels sprouts rather than
making direct health investments by expending time in exercise or purchas-
ing medical care such as a doctor’s visit.
Enjoying healthy living today while refusing to take the time and money
to go to the doctor for check-ups, obtain medical screenings, or refuse to take
medications may mean you are a “young invincible”. This term was coined
by Blue Cross organizations (2004), offering a set of health insurance plans
known as TONIK in three states in order to appeal to “active, young healthy
19- to 29-year olds.” These plans insure only against catastrophic illness and
include little to no incentive for policyholders to make preventive visits to
the doctor because of restrictions on the number of reimbursable visits. The
design of these health insurance plans suggests that healthy behaviors beget
greater future health, but, as our result suggests, the jury should still be out
on this.
PROPOSITION 4: Assume | ddw1 | < 1.
(i) An individual with a high-stress job or lifestyle (high σ ), or one who works
long hours today (high w1) spends more on medical care and more time in
healthy activities today, thereby spending less on consumption or in time
at leisure. These compensations ameliorate the effects of the stress (work) on
future health, income, and the quality of leisure, but may not completely offset
them.
(ii) An individual who foresees long work hours in the future (high w2) will
compensate by consuming fewer goods and spending less time at leisure today,
thereby increasing health investments and increasing future health, income,
and the quality of leisure.
Stress, whether induced by one’s job or by social pressures to conform to
some ideal, and long work hours are undoubtedly bad for you, and uncom-
pensated, they make you worse off since you must give up consumption and
leisure today to offset their effects. This explains why high-stress jobs and jobs
requiring long work hours are often compensated with higher salaries and
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better benefits. Stress and long work hours are often associated with high total
compensation jobs, and these jobs are most often filled with well-educated
individuals. To the extent that an individual is inadequately compensated for
the stress or greater time at work, either through higher income or cheaper
(and/or better) health care, stress and the demands of work diminish the
positive health effects that education and health knowledge generate. Even
if the stressed worker goes to the doctor more often and exercises regularly
as compared with a less-stressed worker, she may not heed the doctor’s advice
to slow down, take a vacation, or cut back on hours.
Grossman and Kaestner (1997) conclude that increases in education re-
sult in increases in health, and of course, education is also a determinant of
occupation and income. We agree with this basic premise; however, we rec-
ognize in this proposition that some factors may erode the positive effect of
education on health via work. Namely, if stress and long hours at work ac-
company greater education and higher paying jobs, then the effect on future
health and income may not be so bright. For example, a recent study found
a link between workplace stress and metabolic syndrome, which is a precur-
sor to diabetes and cardiovascular disease (Chandola, Brunner and Marmot
2006). And yet, the demands of future work induce healthier behaviors today,
since by investing in health today an individual can ameliorate the effects of
longer work hours tomorrow via higher income and higher quality, if less
total, leisure.
PROPOSITION 5: An individual with a low initial health stock invests more in
his health (relative to an individual identical in all ways except initial health), but
may not have higher future health or income or leisure quality. Yet improvements in
the health production technology (higher θ) similar to a higher rate of time discount
(higher δ) lead to compensating reductions in investments in health, with potentially
(certainly) adverse effects on future health, income, and leisure quality.
Both theoretical and empirical work (e.g., Grossman 1972, Russell and
Chaudhuri 1992, Monheit 2003) show a negative correlation between medical
expenditures and health and this is as it should be—the less healthy among
us invest more in their health. In addition, lower initial health follows one
through life. The sacrifices required, in terms of foregone consumption and
leisure when young, to improve future health will generally not achieve the
healthiness of one endowed with better initial health. Thus, those in poor
health may remain less healthy, but still invest substantial resources in their
health at the expense of some consumption and leisure.
If the health technology improves, less consumption and leisure has to be
given up today to maintain one’s health; thus, one may choose to enjoy greater
current pleasures at the expense of lower future health. Thus, expected im-
provements in the health technology, similar to a high rate of time discount,
allow one to focus on the present without worrying about the future. However,
to the extent that the improvement in the health technology is perceived to
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be greater today than it turns out to be in the future, there will be ex post
underinvestment in health. Advances in health technology may not provide
the “miracle cure” after all. For example, an individual may take a medication
to fight obesity today without any other health investments such as exercise;
yet improved future health may be at risk because of offsetting effects of the
drug’s long-term side effects or complications. This possibility should be a
concern to agencies such as the Food and Drug Administration that oversee
the approval of pharmaceuticals and to policymakers, given the increase in
pharmaceutical advertising campaigns aimed directly at individuals.
4. Conclusion
Our model suggests that for policies designed to improve an individual’s
health and happiness to be successful, one must be rewarded for achieving
the goal or penalized for missing it. Unfortunately, penalties that generate
health investments are easier to design than rewards, but penalties force indi-
viduals to trade-off happiness for health, defeating the purpose of the policy.
The problem is that any reward that improves one’s happiness reduces the
benefits of future health. So, how can both health and happiness be im-
proved? Reductions in stress, in work hours (holding income constant), and
in societal demands (peer effects and social norms) all free up resources and
thus can lead to increases in both health and happiness. Living a healthier
lifestyle can also be beneficial, but this requires a change in an individual’s
tastes or an internalization of social preferences. None of these lend them-
selves easily to policy, as policymakers who have sung the benefits of healthier
lifestyles or suggested that we should work less and learn to relax, will attest.
A policy that reduces health care costs today, both in terms of the monetary
cost of medical care and the time cost of healthy activities, and that imposes
a tax tomorrow to pay for the benefit, is the opposite of what most people
face today but may provide the right mix of rewards and penalties to improve
both healthiness and happiness.
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